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Contempt Of Cop:
Disrespect In Retrospect
by Hon. Lawrence H. Rushworth

and Hon. A. Michael Nolan

Scenario 1) A police officer responds
to a complaint alleging that unknown
persons are disturbing the peace in a
public place. While the officer is evaluating the situation, a neighbor continuously interrupts the officer with questions and accusations to the extent that
the officer's ability to effectively resolve
the situation is severely hampered. The
officer repeatedly advises the neighbor to
be quiet and when the neighbor continues to interrupt he is placed under
arrest.
Scenario 2) A police officer arrives at
the scene of a complaint where several
intoxicated persons are engaged in
heated discussions which are about to
ripen into physical confrontation. A large
crowd is gathered, shouting encouragement to the participants and attempting
to esCalate the situation. When the officer
orders the crowd to disperse, most of the
peope leave, except one individual who
states that he was not saying anything,
that it was a public place and that he had
a right to be there. After repeated warnings to disperse he is placed under arrest.
Scenario 3) A police officer is conducting an undercover surveillance of a business where, according to reliable information, a burglary is going to occur. A
suspicious individual appears from the
shadows near the business, apparently
preparing to enter. An unrelated third
party arrives at the location from which
the officer is conducting his observations. The officer identifies himself, explains the situation and requests that the
individualleave quietly. She leaves immediately but, while doing so, yells to the
suspect that the police are watching the
bUilding. The suspect leaves before any
crime occurs and the entire police operation is destroyed. The third party is
placed under arrest.
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I. Introduction
Every day police officers operate in
situations which expose them to various
dangers and difficulties. Proper performance of their duties is often a thankless
job. Their arrival on the scene frequently
is greeted with derision, ridicule and
harassment. The situations described
above are typical of those which frequently occur in police work. Recognizing the unique nature of law enforcement work, the courts and legislature
have created a special set of laws designed to aid and assist police in efficiently discharging their responsibilities.
It is hoped that this article will increase
the understanding in the legal community and among law enforcement officers
of this special set of laws.
When situations arise which are similar to those described above, a troublesome question presents itself. At what
point does seemingly harmless and innocuous behavior become criminal in
nature? In the first scenario, the neighbor is, in aLI probability, merely being
nosy and is not intending to violate the
law. In scenario two, the arrestee was
merely standing on the street, doing
nothing which inherently violates the
law. The third scenario is perhaps slightly
more complicated, but aLI that the arrestee did was to warn an individual not
to violate the law. In most situations,
such actions, would be commended and
not result in an arrest. The charges filed
in these types of scenarios fall into a
broad category of crime entitled "obstruction of justice."
The crime of obstruction of justice has
its roots in early common law. Lewis
Hochheimer, a noted authority on Maryland's common law, states that "[w]ithin
limits not strictly defined acts and omis-

sions immediately injuring the people or
the government are punishable as misdemeanors. "I The Court ofAppeals of Maryland, in Garland v. State,2 agreed that "it
is an indictable offense at common law to
obstruct the due administration of justice."~In 1939, the Maryland General Assembly codified the common law offense
as Article 27 section 30 of the Annotated
Code, which stated:
If any person shall corruptly or by

threats or force endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer in any court of
this State in the discharge of his duty
or shall corruptly or by threats or
force obstruct or impede, or endeavor to obstruct or impede, the
due administration of justice
therein, he shall be liable to be
prosecuted therefor ....
The statute does not specifiywhich acts
would violate the section. In Romans v.
State,5 the court indicated that instead of
providing a laundry list of prohibited
offenses, the statute was "in aid and definition of a class of those criminal acts
which are known to the common law as
obstructions of justice."6The proscribed
conduct, therefore, includes "any attempt to ... corruptly obstruct or impede
the due administration of justice."7 Violations in this area include actual obstruction of court proceedings, whether
by jury tampering, by interfering with
witnesses, or by other means. This article
will focus on that area of the law which involves impeding law enforcement personnel in the performance of their assigned duties. Before considering those
violations defined by statute, we will
discuss the applicable common lawviol~
tions.
/

n. The Common Law
A) OBSTRUCTING, RESISTING, OR

HINDERING A POLICE OFFICER

Two misdemeanors in this area which
are still viable at common law: hindering
or obstructing a police officer and resisting arrest. 8 In the late nineteenth century, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
prohibited interference with police procedure. In Roddy v. Finnegan,9 the court
stated that if a party, who is not concerned with the violation of the law
under investigation, obstructs a police
officer who is inquiring into the violation, the officer has the right to arrest that
person. 10 In Roddy, the police officer
attempted to determine who had illegally
parked a wagon on the street. Finnegan,
the owner of the business where the
wagon was being unloaded, interrupted
the police officer, and told him to stop
interfering with his business. After a brief
scu ffie , Finnegan was arrested. When
tried for the offense, Finnegan was found
not guilty. He filed suit against Roddy for
assault and battery and Roddy appealed
the judgment for Finnegan. Reversing
the lower court, the court of appeals explained that "police officers, like other
officers of the law, are not to be maltreated [while they are] in the faithful
discharge of their duty," and that they
were to be able to perform their activities
"free from malice, ill will, oppression, or
the use of any unnecessary force."n To
the contrary, the court indicated that
police officers were "entitled to aid and
assistance."12
In Busch v. State,13 the court acknowledged the continuing viability of the
Roddy decision stating:
In Roddy, this Court acknowledged
that resisting an officer in the performance of his duties was an offense that could occur even before
there was an arrest. Accordingly, this
case demonstrates that an arrest is
not essential to the offense of resisting, hindering, or obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties. 14
Two years later, the court of appeals in
Cover v. State)) again considered the
question of impeding a police operation
and listed the elements of the crime of
obstructing and hindering a police officer:
1) A police officer engaged in the
performance of a duty;
2) An act, or perhaps an omission, by
the accused which obstructs or hinders the officer in the performance
of that duty;

3) Knowledge by the accused of the
facts comprising (1); and
4) Intent to obstruct or hinder the
officer by the act or omission constituting (2) above. 16
The Cover court engaged in a thorough analysis of the history and tradition
of the common law crime. Quoting a
British law review article, the court defined three separate and distinct categories of violations:
1) Positive direct obstruction: Those
cases in which the constable acts directly against the citizen or his property and is physically restrained;
2) Passive direct obstruction: Those
cases "in which the constable seeks
to make the citizen act directly, and
the citizen refuses or fails to act as
required; and
3) Positive indirect obstruction:
Those cases in which "the police are
not acting directly against the citizen, but are acting indirectly against
other citizens who are, or may be
about to commit offences (sic)
against the criminal law, and a citizen does an act which obstructs
them in their general duty to prevent
or detect crime, intending to frustrate the police operation.)7

"police officers were
'entitled to aid and
assistance. '"
Violations in the first category, positive
direct obstruction, are probably the most
frequent. They most often occurwhen an
officer is attempting to investigate a suspected violation of the law and an uninvolved third party inserts himself into the
investigation in an attempt to inhibit its
effectiveness. However, there must be an
actual obstruction of the officer. "Merely
being impertinent to an officer, or daring
him to make an arrest has been declared
insufficient to amount interference with
him in the performance of his duties."18
InHoward v. State, 19 police officers were
attempting to place the defendant'S wife
under arrest when Howard struck the arresting officer to prevent his wife's detention. He was convicted of resisting
and hindering a police officer in the
lawful performance of his duties. While
often the interference in these cases is
physical, as in Howard, courts have
upheld violations alleging indirect interference as well. In Mayne v. State, 20
Mayne discovered his wife's body along

with physical evidence, including a knife,
which was indicative of suicide. The
court held that his substitution of a different knife and the making of false statements to the police constituted a crime
(obstruction of justice). This category
also includes those cases wherein an individual is being investigated or even arrested by the police and provides false information as to his identity, address, or
other facts, in an attempt to misdirect the
inquiry. The key consideration is that the
interference must adversely impact the
officer's effectiveness in handling the
situation at hand; the ultimate outcome
of the investigation is of no consequence.
The second category, passive direct
obstruction, is almost as frequent as the
first category. These cases usually concern an officer giving an individual or a
group an order to leave the area of an
incident. These "move along" cases result
in the arrest of an individual who fails to
comply with the officer's order. In Maryland, several statutes exist which cover
this area of interference which will be examined in this article.
In Cover, the court dealt with the third
category, positive indirect obstruction.
The facts were similar to those in the
third scenario at the beginning of this
article. The alleged interference, however, was the repeated blowing of an
automobile horn, not a definitive verbal
warning. Ms. Cover was convicted of
obstructing and hindering a police officer. The court of appeals reversed the
lower court's decision and held that
there was not a sufficient showing that
the blowing of the horn was for the
purpose of alerting the suspect. 21 While a
warning would constitute interference
as envisioned in these types of crimes, the
facts of the case at hand were held insufficient to support such a finding.
B) RESISTING ARREST

The second common law misdemeanor in this area of law is resisting
arrest. "A refusal to submit to lawful
arrest and resistance to an officer of the
law in the performance of his duties
constitutes an offense at common law,
and is an offense in this State."22 There
are five elements which have to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to
establish guilt: 1) there has to be an arrest
of the defendant; 2) the arrest must have
been lawful; 3) the defendant must have
refused to submit to the arrest; 4) the
arrest must have been made by an officer
of the law, and must have been in the
course of the lawful performance of his
duties; and 5) the officer must have identified himself as a police officer. 23 The key
difference between this offense and reSisting, obstructing, or hindering a po20.2/fhe Law Forum-17

lice officer is that in resisting arrest, the
resistance must be to an actual arrest.
It is generally held that resistance to an
unlawful arrest is permissible. "[I]n such
case, the officer not only is not acting in
the performance of official duties, but
contrary to them, for such conduct can
only be regarded as a trespass against the
person whom he illegally arrests."24 Citing several sources, the Sugarman court
stated that "one illegally arrested may use
any reasonable means to effect his escape, even to the extent of using such
force as is reasonably necessary."25 The
major problem with this doctrine is that
only a court can rule on the validity of an
arrest. The individual placed under arrest may truly believe that he is resisting
an unlawful arrest, but later learn that his
resistance was criminal because the court
determined the arrest to be valid. 26
In Rodgers v. State, 27 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland further limited
this lawful resistance doctrine. The case
presented the question of the propriety
of resistance to an arrest upon a judicially
issued arrest warrant, even when the arrestee believed that the warrant was invalid or improper. Reviewing the case law
on resisting arrest, the court found that
the cases supporting resistance to unlawful arrest were all related to warrantless
arrests. In a warrantless arrest Situation,
the arrest is generally made immediately
upon discovery of a crime, often at the
scene when emotions are high and there
is little, if any, time to reflect upon the
validity of the arrest. The court noted,
however, that:
where a warrant is the basis of the arrest, it presumably has been issued
in the quiet atmosphere surrounding the issuing judicial officer where
he has had an opportunity to reflect
upon and measure the facts presented to him before reaching his
decision to issue the arrest warrant.
Once it is issued, the police have no
alternative than to perform the ministerial duty of executing the judicial
officer's order.
The court further stated:
[An] individual may not lawfully use
force to resist an arrest where he has
been advised by authorized police
officers that a warrant for his arrest
has been duly issued and that, pursuant to the command of the warrant,
the officers are endeavoring to effect
his arrest, even though it is later determined at a judicial hearing the
warrant was defective. 29
An important distinction has been
noted by the courts between the act of
resisting arrest and flight from a police
officer to avoid apprehension. In running from an officer who may be attempt18-The Law Forum!20.2

ing to effect an arrest, an individual is
merely avoiding an arrest and not resisting the officer's attempts. ''Jerking away
from an officer is obstructing him, but
cursing him is not. "30 Additionally, the resistance must be during the actual arrest.
If an individual is under arrest and being
transported to the police station and
while enroute, strikes the transporting
police officer, he is certainly gUilty of
battery, but not of resisting arrest. 31
Furthermore, commentators have noted
that generally, some type of overt act is
necessary to constitute the resistance.
For mere words to be sufficient, they
must be of such a nature and spoken in
such circumstances that the person making the arrest must have "reasonable
grounds to believe that he cannot proceed with the arrest without incurring
evident risk of serious injury."32

one illegally
arrested may use
any reasonable
means to effect his
rh ... "
escayB
it

III. Statutory Violations
A) CRIMINAL CODE

In addition to the common law violations, there are several statutes which define specific crimes within this category.
Article 27, section 150 states:
Any person who makes a false statement, report, or complaint, or who
causes a false statement, report, or
complaint to be made, to any peace
or police officer of the State, or of any
county, city or other political subdivision of this State, knowing the
same, or any material part thereof, to
be false and with the intent to deceive and with the intent to cause an
investigation or other action to be
taken as a result thereof, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not more than five
hundred dollars ($500.00), orbeimprisoned not more than six (6)
months, or be both fined and imprisoned, in the discretion of the court. H
In tbe King v. Manley,34 the British
court defined the making of a false statement or report to the police causing the
police to "devote their time and services
to the investigation of [the] idle charge"
as the crime of "effecting a public mischief." The cases in Maryland which have
involved section 150 have dealt mostly
with situations similar to those in

Manley, in which a false report of a crime
resulted in a police officer initiating an
investigation "to the end that the public
was deprived of the services of the
police."H The United States District
Court for the District of Maryland noted
that neither the common law nor this section clearly excludes or includes lying to
the police as a crime, and that the criminality of a statement depends on the
circumstances involved. 36
In 7bomas v. State,37 the defendant reported to police that while walking down
the street, he was shot in the foot by the
occupant of a passing vehicle. Although
he felt pain, he stated that he did not
realize until later that evening that he had
been shot when he noticed blood on his
shoe. The police investigation ultimately
revealed that the defendant had shot
himself in the foot during a violent confrontation with an individual who was
killed.
In Sine v. State,38 the defendant staged
an automobile accident involving a UHaul truck which was operated by a party
to the scheme. The driver of the truck was
clearly at fault in the "accident," and the
conspirators hoped to realize a sizeable
settlement from the U-Haul company. In
an appeal from his conviction for making
a false statement or report to the police,
Sine argued that he had not made any
statements to the police. He further argued that the statements made by his
friends were not false because the U-Haul
truck actually struck the car involved in
the accident. In answering the first of
these contentions, the court held that
while Sine personally made no statements to the police officers, the statements which were made were a "part and
parcel" of the scheme to defraud the
company. Since the crime was a misdemeanor, all participants in the scheme
were prinCipals to the crime. 39 As to the
second argument, the court held that
while the statements may have been at
least partially true, they were made in
such a manner as to indicate the intent to
deceive. Thus they were false for the purposes of Article 27 section 150. 40
Several cases have considered whether
the wording of the statute is broad
enough to include cases involving more
than the Manley type of violation. The
statute includes a "false statement" in addition to false report or complaint, resulting not only in an investigation, but
also any "other action" to be taken as the
result of the falSity. In 1988, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland considered
the question and made a definitive ruling
as to the scope of the law. In Johnson v.

State,41 the issue presented was whether
the giving of false identification (such as
name Qr address), in response to questioning by the police after an individual
was placed under arrest, was within section 150. The court construed the section
to apply to "that type of mischief [which
was] the 'false alarm' to the police that is
analogous to the false fire alarm."42 Continuing, the court stated that Johnson
had not gone to the police to make a false
statement and that his purpose was to
divert an ongoing investigation, not to
initiate one.
We do not believe the giving offalse
information in response to routine
questioning by the police, even
though it is likely to hinder or delay
an investigation already underway,
is the type of false statement, report,
or complaint that comes within the
'false alarm' public mischief the General Assembly intended to criminalize when it enacted section 150.43
The court specifically avoided the
question of whether lying to the police
was a criminal offense, although they
suggested that it may possibly constitute
the crime of obstructing, hindering, or
interfering,44 as discussed above.
Another statute which falls into this
area of the law is Article 27, section 123,
disorderlyconduct. 45 While the statute itself appears to have little to do with disobedience to or interference with police
procedures, the courts have interpreted
the statute to include precisely that behavior. In Drews v. State,46 the facts involved a policy, established by an amusement park, which prohibited blacks from
entering the park. Drews, a white man,
had gone to the park in the company of
four other individuals, two of whom
were black. They were ordered to leave
the park several times and when they refused, they were placed under arrest for
disorderly conduct. Drews appealed his
conviction claiming that even though the
group was deliberately trespassing, they
had done nothing which constituted a
breach of the public peace. They had
merely refused to leave when ordered to
do so by the management and the police.
In answering this argument, the court
stated that the gist of the crime of disorderly conduct "is the doing or saying, or
both, of that which offends, disturbs, inCites, or tends to incite a number of
people gathered in the same area. "47
When Drews and his companions refused to leave the park, a large crowd
gathered to watch the argument. The
persons arrested joined hands, refused
to leave and had to be physically removed
from the premises. "[FJailure to obey a

policeman's command to move on when
not to do so may endanger the public
peace, amounts to disorderly conduct."48
While arguably the behavior in Drews
was in and of itself disorderly in nature,
the courts have applied this rationale in
several "more peaceable" situations. In
Sharpe v. State,49 a police officer requested the driver of a vehicle stopped
for a traffic violation to remove his license
from his wallet. The driver raised his
voice slightly, and when he uttered a
profane expletive, he was arrested for
disorderly conduct. There were no
crowds and only the officer was present.
In affirming Sharpe's conviction, the
court rationalized that the "[r]efusal to
obey a proper order of an officer may
constitute an offense justifying an arrest,
particularly where there is profanity in
the presence of others that may threaten
a breach of the peace. "50

U{rjefusal to obey a
proper order of an
officer may constitute an offense... "
Many local jurisdictions have enacted
ordinances along these same lines. Generally entitled "lOitering," these ordinances permit an officer to arrest an
individual who remains in an area after
being ordered to leave by the police officer. While the specific prohibitions vary
from area to area, most require a showing that the individual ordered to leave
did not have any lawful business in the
area. If the officer returns within a specified time period, and the individual previously warned is still present, he can be
arrested. The Baltimore City Council recently enacted a "super-loitering" ordinance creating "drug free zones" in an
attempt to alleviate the increaSingly serious problem of "open-air" drug markets
operating on street corners. 51 Areas
known for high narcotics traffic are conspicuously posted. The signs take the
place of prior notification by police. The
ordinance states that "[ a] police officer
shall first request a person suspected of
loitering under this section within a drug
free zone to leave the premises. Failure to
obey the police officer shall subject the
person to arrest."52 It must be shown that
a person is "behaving in a manner raising
a reasonable belief that the person is
engaging or is about to engage in illegal
drug activity. "5~ The ordinance provides
circumstances which may be considered
in establishing this reasonable belief in-

eluding information received from reliable sources, membership in a gang or
association which routinely engages in illegal drug activity, or actual activity observed, such as exchanging small packages for money or operating as a lookout.
B) 1RANSPORTA110N ARl1CLE

Although the General Assembly has
passed few statutes in this area of the law
with regards to the criminal code (Article
27), the Transportation Article has several sections which apply. Section 16112(e) states that "[a] person may not
give the name of another person or give
a false or fictitious name to any uniformed police officer who is attempting
to determine the identity of a driver of a
motor vehicle."54 Note that the statute is
applicable only in the limited circumstances stated and is not a blanket ban. If
the officer is in plain clothes, or if the investigation is for a different purpose, for
example, identifying passengers, then
the section does not apply. The maximum penalty is a fine of $255. 55
Far more serious is the crime of fleeing
and eluding a police officer. Section 21904 prohibits any attempt to flee or avoid
apprehension by a police officer who is
attempting to effect a traffic stop.56 The
section prohibits fleeing by failing to stop
a moving vehicle, fleeing on foot, or
fleeing by other means. The police officer
must either be in uniform, or operating
an "appropriately marked official police
vehicle," and must give a visual or an audible signal to stop. The penalty for a first
violation of this section is a $1000 fine,
one year incarceration, or both. For a
subsequent violation, the potential incarceration increases to two years. Violations may also result in revocation of the
operator's privilege to drive, since twelve
points are assessed on the driving record.
Section 21-103 57 provides perhaps the
broadest power to a police officer specified anywhere in the code. The section
states that "[a] person may not lawfully
disobey any lawful order-or direction of
any police officer."58 Since this section
includes no limitations, it is possible that
this catch-all provision may apply beyond
situations involving motor vehicles. It is a
misdemeanor, as are all violations of the
Transportation Article, and has a maximum fine of $255.
IV. Conclusion
The job of a police officer is difficult at
best. The specialized group of legal pronouncements discussed in this article
assist officers by facilitating cooperation
and punishing those who intentionally
impede the smooth flow of the criminal
justice system. However, misunder20.2(fhe Law Forum-19

standing of these laws, misapplication by
the police, and misinterpretation by the
legal community have exacerbated the
problems. Over a century ago, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland emphasized the
importance of providing aid and assistance to law enforcement. 59 It is hoped
that by clarifying the laws surrounding
this unique profession, this article has
simplified compliance with the court's
mandate.
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